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INTRODUCTION 
genuine democracy is incompatible with secrecy. 
Meaningful citizen participation in policy formation and 
oversight presupposes access to relevant information. 
Information is the fulcrum on which every form of 
accountability turns.  
In no domain is such access more important than in matters 
involving “national security” - the government’s responses to 
perceive external and internal threats to public safety and the 
territorial integrity of the State. Yet democratic societies typically 
give executive officials (who have multiple motives to opt for 
unjustified secrecy) the unilateral power to conceal any information 
to which they choose to attach the “national security” label. This 
common practice thus disconnects part of the essential machinery 
of democracy. In an era of transnational terrorism and ever 
expanding conceptions of what “national security” means, 
secrecy’s potential for eroding democratic values is growing, even 
at a time when societies seek more than ever to promote openness 
in government.  
The US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) gives courts the 
power (and responsibility) to counteract these tendencies. 
Although FOIA’s “Exemption 1” excludes from obligatory 
disclosure any “properly classified” information,
1
 FOIA instructs 
U.S. courts to review whether any secrecy classification was 
“proper” and thus sufficient to trigger Exemption 1.  
This paper examines US judicial decision-making in FOIA 
Exemption 1 cases. It finds that American judges, with perhaps 
surprising frequency, have successfully compelled the release of 
important national security information. It also finds, however, 
that US FOIA has not always lived up to its potential. US courts 
often give a strong presumption of validity to executive secrecy 
claims, largely because they see national security as a domain of 
                                                
1 National security information can be classified at several different levels of sensitivity. 
Information is designated “Secret” when disclosure could cause “serious damage” and 
“Top Secret” for “exceptionally grave damage.” EXEC. ORDER 13526 (Dec. 29, 2009), 
75 FED. REG. 707, at § 1.2(a) (Jan. 5 2010). A 1997 Report estimated that two million 
U.S. government employees and another million who work for government contractors 
in private industry have the authority to make national security classification decisions. 
See COMMISSION ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOVERNMENT SECRECY, 
REPORT, S.Doc. 105-32, at 30 (1997) [hereinafter cited as PRES. COMM.]. The number is 
no doubt even larger today. 
A 
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unique executive expertise. Such deference, and the assumption of 
executive expertise on which it rests, go to the heart of FOIA’s 
promise and limitations in the national security context. I argue, 
however, that judicial reverence for executive expertise and the 
converse assumption of outsider incompetence are both 
misplaced. 
Though executive officers often have undeniable expertise in 
military matters and foreign affairs, they face powerful incentives 
to impose secrecy for reasons tied only to bureaucratic self-interest. 
Equally important, agencies in the executive branch are not the 
only ones that have national security expertise. Of course, 
individual judges typically do not have this kind of knowledge and 
experience. But courts as institutions routinely deploy procedures 
to insure that relevant expertise can be brought to bear. Moreover, 
appropriate judgments about whether to disclose information 
depend on striking a balance between the relative benefits of both 
secrecy and transparency. Judges may lack personal expertise in 
national security, but they are well placed to assess the value of 
transparency, and they are society’s quintessential specialists in 
crafting fine-grained compromises that duly accommodate 
conflicting interests. National security officials, in contrast, 
instinctively resist transparency as a matter of principle, and 
typically they have little appetite for the fine-grained, fact-sensitive 
judgments that can permit limited disclosure without posing any 
genuine risk to national security. 
The paper explores the possibilities for using US FOIA (and 
analogous freedom-of-information authorities in other nations) to 
afford a more effective check on executive self-dealing and self-
protection, in order to assure greater transparency in national 
security matters, while also maintaining robust protection for truly 
sensitive secrets. 
§ 1 – THE US FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA)  
Under FOIA, all US government records must be publicly 
available, except when a specific statutory exemption applies.
2
 
Several exemptions potentially apply in national security matters, 
most centrally Exemption 1, which protects all information that “in 
the interest of national defense or foreign policy [is] properly 
classified.”
3
 
This FOIA exemption is much narrower that the “state secrets 
privilege” available in other litigation. When a litigant seeks 
damages or an injunction against government action, state secrets 
privilege shields any information that a high official certifies as too 
sensitive to disclose.
4
 And if the litigation cannot fairly proceed 
                                                
2 5 USC § 552(a),(b) (2009). 
3 5 USC § 552(b)(1) (2009). For technical or tactical reasons, the government sometimes 
invokes other exemptions as well. Because these largely duplicate Exemption 1 in national 
security cases, they will not be discussed separately. 
4 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
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without such information (for example, when “the very subject 
matter” involves a state secret or when a state secret is allegedly 
relevant to a possible government defense), state secrets privilege 
requires courts to dismiss the case.
5
 In contrast, in a FOIA case 
(one in which the applicant seeks only disclosure of specified 
documents), Exemption 1 procedures require much closer judicial 
oversight -- in six distinct ways: 
1) FOIA requires agencies to identify classified material page-by-
page and section-by-section;
6
 they cannot, as in a state secrets case, 
claim protection for an entire document simply because the subject 
matter involves national security.  
2) FOIA imposes a filtering process, requiring that “[a]ny 
reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided … after 
deletion of the portions which are exempt.”
7
  
3) Although state secrets precedent discourages judges from 
looking at the classified material in camera,
8
 FOIA carries no similar 
presumption against in camera inspection.
9
 
4) In considering FOIA exemption 1 issues, the court must 
“determine the matter de novo, … and the burden is on the agency 
to sustain its action.”
10
  
5) The FOIA mandate to segregate non-exempt material is 
bolstered by “a detailed and strictly enforced set of procedural 
requirements.”
11
 Exemption claims must be explained in a so-
called Vaughn index, a meticulous log of requested documents, with 
a specific, non-boilerplate rationale for exemption in each case.
12
  
6) Ex parte determinations are disfavored. FOIA courts insist that 
the Vaughn index provide “as complete a public record as is 
possible”
13
 and reject the index where, due to lack of specificity, it 
“does not permit effective advocacy.”
14
 In contrast, courts uphold 
                                                
5 An additional blocking effect of state secrets privilege is that secret information may be 
necessary to establish the plaintiff’s standing to sue. When such information is subject to 
the privilege, its absence from the record will leave the plaintiff unable to establish 
standing and courts will be obliged to dismiss the case. FOIA presents a stark contrast: 
any person can file a FOIA request; there is no requirement of standing. 
6 See, for example., Allen v. CIA, 636 F.2d 1287, 1293 (DC Cir. 1980); Schiller v. NLRB, 
964 F.2d 1205, 1209 (DC Cir. 1992) (“agency cannot justify withholding an entire 
document simply by showing that it contains some exempted material”). 
7 5 USC § 552(b) (2009); See Ctr. For Int’l Envtl. Law v. Office of US Trade Rep., 505 
F.Supp.2d 150, 158) (DDC 2007) (“Even if Exemption 1 is [applicable], USTR may not 
automatically withhold the full document as categorically exempt without disclosing any 
segregable portions.”). 
8 See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953). 
9 5 USC § 552(a)(4)(B) (2009).  
10 5 USC § 552(a)(4)(B) (2009). 
11 Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 63 (DC Cir. 1983). 
12 Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826-28 (DC Cir. 1973). See Wiener v. FBI, 943 F.2d 972, 
978-79 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding “boilerplate” Vaughn index inadequate). 
13 Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009, 1013 (DC Cir. 1976). 
14 Wiener, supra, 943 F.2d at 979; Ellsberg, supra, 709 F.2d at 63 (index must permit 
“adversarial testing”). 
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state secrets privilege on grounds never disclosed to the plaintiff, 
occasionally acknowledging that this procedure “is no doubt 
frustrating” to the plaintiff.
15
  
Although FOIA can thus be a formidable weapon for transparency 
in national security matters, its procedures have softened regarding 
both in camera inspection and de novo review. 
A) IN CAMERA INSPECTION  
In 1973, in EPA v. Mink,
16
 the Supreme Court held that legislation 
then in effect gave the executive exclusive authority to determine 
when secrecy classification was appropriate. As interpreted in 
Mink, FOIA did not permit judicial review of government claims 
that FOIA disclosure was precluded by Exemption 1. The decision 
was widely condemned in Congress, which at the time was 
intensely resisting the claims of executive prerogative asserted by 
the Nixon Administration. As a result, Congress promptly 
overruled Mink; in 1974 Congress amended FOIA to require 
courts to decide whether records “are in fact properly classified.”
17
  
The amendments encouraged judges to determine the propriety of 
classification by examining the targeted documents in camera,
18
 but 
from the start Congress indicated ambivalence on this score. The 
legislative history is replete with statements describing in camera 
inspection as crucial for “the accountability necessary for 
Government to function smoothly,”
19
 but the Conference 
Committee also stated that “[b]efore the court orders in camera 
inspection, the Government should be given the opportunity to 
establish by means of testimony or detailed affidavits that the 
documents are clearly exempt.”
20
 
In the first decade following the 1974 amendments, courts 
frequently examined material in camera,
21
 but then many courts 
                                                
15 For example, El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 312 (4th Cir. 2007) (dismissing suit 
charging abduction for interrogation under torture); cf. Ellsberg, supra, 709 F.2d at 63 
(requirement of adversarial testing, as applicable in FOIA, does not apply in assessing 
state secrets privilege). 
16 EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973). 
17 5 USC § 552(b)(1)(B) (2009) (emphasis added); see S.REP. 93-1200, 93d Cong., 2d 
Sess., CONFERENCE REPORT ON THE 1974 AMENDMENTS, at 8-9 (declaring 
“Congressional intent to override the Supreme Court’s holding in the case of E.P.A. v. 
Mink”). 
18 Id. at 8-9 (in many situations involving classified information, in camera inspection “will 
plainly be necessary and appropriate”); Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1195 (DC Cir. 1978) 
(district court can inspect classified material in camera “without anxiety that the law 
interposes an extraordinary hurdle to such inspection.”). 
19 Ray v. Turner, supra, 587 F.2d, at n.18 (quoting Senator Muskie). 
20 S.REP. 93-1200, 93d Cong., 2nd Sess., CONFERENCE REPORT ON THE 1974 
AMENDMENTS, at 9. 
21 For example, Dunaway v. Webster, 519 F.Supp. 1059, 1064 (ND Cal. 1981) (340 classified 
documents); Hamlin v. Kelley, 1980 US Dist. LEXIS 11547, 1-5 (ND Ill. 1980) (several 
cartons of classified documents). 
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began deploying a presumption against it.
22
 Under one test, if 
“agency affidavits … demonstrate that material withheld is logically 
within the domain of the exemption claimed, and … are neither 
controverted by contrary record evidence nor impugned by bad faith on the 
part of the agency,” then in camera inspection is unnecessary, and 
summary judgment should be granted for the government.
23
 This 
standard almost returns the law to its pre-1974 bar on judicial 
oversight, because a petitioner has little hope of demonstrating that 
documents held by the intelligence community are not “logically 
within the domain” of national security and has no way to provide 
“record evidence” contradicting the agency affidavit. Some courts 
have made the petitioner’s burden even more difficult by accepting 
Vaughn indexes and agency affidavits under seal, so that the judge 
never sees the allegedly sensitive material and the petitioner never 
even sees the government’s description of it.
24
 
Compounding these obstacles to in camera review is the “Glomar 
response,” in which an agency refuses to confirm or deny the 
existence of the documents sought, on the theory that merely 
acknowledging their existence could disclose protected 
information.
25
 Courts have permitted a Glomar response even when 
they find it hard to credit the factual basis for the claim.
26
 When 
upheld, of course, the Glomar response moots any possibility of in 
camera inspection, because there are no longer any known 
documents to inspect. 
Despite these developments, in camera inspection has by no means 
disappeared.
27
 But prevailing conceptions of expertise and 
appropriate deference often seem to make independent judicial 
inspection in camera a superfluous formality. As a result in camera 
inspection occurs far less often than a system of assertive oversight 
would seem to require. 
                                                
22 For example, Halpern v. FBI, 181 F.3d 279, 295 (2d Cir. 1999) (in camera review “the 
exception, not the rule”). 
23 King v. Dept. of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 217-18 (DC Cir. 1987) (emphasis added). Compare 
Halpern, supra, 181 F.3d at 293, 295 (district court had discretion to examine documents 
in camera, if government failed to provide “fact-specific justification” for exemption.). 
24 For example, NY Times Co. v. Dept. of Justice, 499 F.Supp.2d 501, 519 (SDNY 2007); 
Wheeler v. Dept. of Justice, 403 F.Supp.2d 1, 5 (DDC 2005). 
25 Phillippi, supra, 546 F.2d at 1012-13 (petitioners sought documents relating to the Glomar 
Explorer – a ship allegedly built to recover a sunken Soviet submarine). 
26 For example, ACLU v. Dept. of Defense, 389 F.Supp.2d 547, 564-66 (SDNY 2005) 
(noting “concern that the purpose of the CIA’s Glomar responses is less to protect 
intelligence activities … than to conceal possible violations of law … I am not given 
enough information to make the de novo determinations that FOIA would seem to require. 
[N]otwithstanding FOIA’s clear statutory command [for de novo determination], there is 
small scope for judicial evaluation in this area.”). 
27 For example, Spirko v. US Postal Service, 147 F.3d 992, 994 (DC Cir. 1998); Public Citizen 
v. Dept. of State, 787 F.Supp. 12, 14 (DDC 1992). 
 Access to National Security Information under the US Freedom of Information Act – 
Stephen J. Schulhofer. 
– 262 – 
International Journal of Open Government 
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php?journal=RIGO 
B) DE NOVO REVIEW 
As in the case of in camera inspection, Congress’s commitment to 
de novo review was ambivalent. The 1974 amendments, as originally 
proposed, limited Exemption 1 review to determining whether 
classification had a “reasonable basis.” But on the Senate floor, that 
language drew strong opposition and was stricken, with the effect 
of extending to Exemption 1 the same de novo standard applicable 
to review of other FOIA exemption claims.
28
 After that version 
passed both houses, President Ford (who had succeeded Nixon 
after the latter’s resignation under fire) vetoed it, calling judicial 
oversight of classification an unconstitutional infringement on 
executive authority. He also proposed in the alternative that courts 
“would have to uphold the classification if there is a reasonable 
basis to support it.”
29
 Congress ignored Ford’s compromise 
proposal and overrode the veto, enacting the bill with the de novo 
review standard intact.
30
 As the US Court of Appeals for the DC 
Circuit explained shortly after the enactment:
31
 
[T]he Administration … argued that de novo responsibility … could 
not properly be assigned to judges, in part because of logistical 
problems, and in part because of their lack of relevant experience 
and meaningful appreciation of the implications of the material 
involved. Those who prevailed in the legislature … [rejecting that 
view,] stressed the need for an objective, independent judicial 
determination, and insisted that judges could be trusted to 
approach the national security determinations with common sense, 
and without jeopardy to national security. 
But while Congress rejected “reasonable basis” review, it left room 
for some shading of the de novo standard. The Conference 
Committee report noted that:
32
 
the Executive departments … have unique insights into what 
adverse effects might occur as a result of public disclosure of a 
particular classified record. Accordingly the conferees expect that 
Federal courts, in making de novo determinations … will accord 
substantial weight to an agency’s affidavit concerning the … 
classified status of the disputed record. 
Early decisions applying the new standard hewed closely to the 
spirit of de novo review.
33
 But most courts quickly became more 
                                                
28 See FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974, 94th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1975), at 302-328 [hereinafter cited as FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 
ACT AMENDMENTS]. 
29 MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD VETOING HR 12471, HRDoc. 93-
383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), quoted in Ray v. Turner, supra, 587 F.2d at n. 16. 
30 See FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AMENDMENTS, at 484-485. 
31 Ray v. Turner, supra, 587 F.2d at 1193-94. 
32 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 19. 
33 For example, Allen, supra, 636 F.2d at 1294; Nuclear Control Inst. v. Nuclear Reg. Comm., 
563 F.Supp. 768 (DDC 1983). 
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deferential, and deference has remained the dominant pattern,
34
 
especially after a 1985 Supreme Court decision declared that CIA 
assertions concerning national security impact “are worthy of great 
deference given the magnitude of the national security interests and 
potential risks at stake.”
35
 In effect, the “reasonable basis” standard 
rejected by Congress in 1974 has become the test that most courts 
apply in practice.
36
 Deference is sometimes carried even further. 
Courts have declared that agency affidavits are entitled to “utmost 
deference,”
37
 that a FOIA judge must accept the affidavit if it is 
“not called into question by contradictory evidence in the 
record,”
38
 or that deference is required whenever the documents 
sought “arguably” or “logically” fall within Exemption 1.
39
  
If these readily invoked arguments should happen to be 
unavailable, the government can still support an Exemption 1 claim 
by resorting to the so called “mosaic” theory. In Halperin v. CIA, 
the plaintiffs filed a FOIA demand for disclosure of amounts that 
the CIA had paid for legal fees. Acknowledging that there was no 
apparent way this information could endanger national security, the 
DC Circuit nonetheless found Exemption 1 applicable: “[M]uch 
like a piece of a jigsaw puzzle,” the court said, this bit of 
information “[w]hen combined with other small leads, could well 
prove useful for identifying a covert transaction.”
40
 When this 
argument is pressed, courts are left with little role to play; even 
“seemingly innocuous”
41
 information can qualify as “properly 
classified” and therefore protected from FOIA disclosure. 
After Halperin, mosaic arguments proliferated,
42
 and courts usually 
have acquiesced, even in cases involving exceptionally far-fetched 
claims.
43
 The mosaic theory is so elastic that it can encompass 
dangers the experts themselves do not perceive. A Seventh Circuit 
                                                
34 See Christina E. Wells, “National Security Information” and the Freedom of 
Information Act, 56 AD. L. REV. 1195, 1207 (2004); Robert P. Deyling, Judicial 
Deference and De Novo Review in Litigation Over National Security Information under 
the Freedom of Information Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 67, 82-86 (1992); Patricia M. Wald, 
Two Unsolved Constitutional Problems, 49 U.PITT. L. REV. 753, 760 (1988) (former 
Chief Judge of DC Circuit noting that review in Exemption 1 cases “often seems to be 
done in a perfunctory way.”). 
35 CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178-79 (1985). 
36 See Adam M. Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for Judicial 
Intervention, 53 UCLA L. REV. 911, 940 (2006) (finding that reasonable-basis review is 
“ironically, a good summation of post-1974 practice”). 
37 Taylor v. Dept. of the Army, 684 F.2d 99, 109 (DC Cir. 1982) (emphasis added). 
38 Halperin, supra, 629 F.2d at 147-148. 
39 Maynard v. CIA, 986 F.2d 547, 556 (1st Cir. 1993). 
40 Halperin, supra, 629 F.2d at 150. 
41 CIA v. Sims, supra, 471 U.S. at 179. 
42 David E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory, National Security and the Freedom of 
Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 643-45 (2005). 
43 For example, Aftergood v. CIA, 355 F.Supp.2d 557 (DDC 2005) (aggregate amount of 
CIA budget for 1947); Berman v. CIA, 378 F.Supp.2d 1209, 1217-18 (ED Cal. 2005) 
(Presidential Daily Briefs from Lyndon Johnson administration).  
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decision upheld the CIA position that all of its information from 
public sources was exempt from disclosure, on the ground that if the 
agency were required to identify and release non-sensitive items, 
“whoever makes the decision on the behalf of the CIA may miss 
some clue that foreign intelligence services would catch and thus 
may inadvertently reveal secrets.”
44
 The theory of unseen but 
perilous mosaic inferences thus allows secrecy not only for alleged 
dangers a judge cannot appreciate but also for imagined dangers a 
trained intelligence expert might overlook. When taken to that 
extreme, mosaic theory in effect precludes any possibility of judicial 
review. Mosaic arguments, because they can’t be falsified, in effect 
force courts to abdicate their reviewing function altogether.
45
 
The reasons for judicial resistance to de novo review are not 
mysterious. The 1974 Congress concluded that federal courts, after 
giving “substantial weight” to the agency’s view, can then make a 
sound independent assessment. But many judges believe they are 
not competent to disagree with national security experts.
46
 
Compounding that concern is anxiety about the magnitude of the 
harm if they should err in discounting the dangers of disclosure.
47
  
In giving primacy to such concerns, however, most courts have 
simply ignored the congressional judgments that motivated the 
1974 legislation. Congress found that decisions of “experts” were 
often guided by bureaucratic self-interest, not by their expertise. It 
found that insufficient oversight had led to abuses and to a 
weakening of national security itself. And Congress expressed a 
foundational political value, that just as too much disclosure can be 
dangerous, too much secrecy can harm the nation as well. Federal 
judges confronting Exemption 1 claims typically give little or no 
weight to these concerns.
48
 They posit that agency decisions are 
motivated solely by concern for national security harm, even when 
circumstances strongly suggest the contrary.
49
 And they assume 
that any risk of imprudent disclosure is intolerable, while 
imprudent secrecy is assumed to impose little or no social costs.  
C) ASSESSING FOIA’S IMPACT 
Although FOIA oversight is far from robust in the national 
security arena, the statute remains a significant vehicle for 
                                                
44 Bassiouni v. CIA, 392 F.3d 244 (7th Cir. 2004). 
45 For example, Halperin, supra, 629 F.2d at 148 (judges may not “second-guess”). 
Compare Cntr. for Nat. Security Studies, supra, 331 F.3d at 951 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (mosaic 
reasoning “drastically diminish[es], if not eliminat[es] the judiciary’s role”). 
46 See, for example, Halperin, supra, 629 F.2d at 148 (judges lack necessary expertise); Wald, 
supra note 33, at 760 (judges “often feel inadequate or incompetent to address either the 
factual predicates or the policy judgments involved”). 
47 See CIA v. Sims, supra, 471 U.S. at 178-79. 
48 For exceptions, see Pozen, supra note 42, at 652. 
49 For example, ACLU v. Dept. of Defense, 389 F.Supp.2d 547, 564-66 (SDNY 2005) 
(upholding exemption despite “concern that CIA’s purpose … is less to protect 
intelligence activities … than to conceal possible violations of law”). 
 Access to National Security Information under the US Freedom of Information Act – 
Stephen J. Schulhofer. 
– 265 – 
International Journal of Open Government 
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php?journal=RIGO 
transparency. In camera inspection, if less frequent than Congress 
expected, is by no means rare.
50
 Likewise, review de novo is often an 
empty fiction, but many judges bring skeptical scrutiny to 
Exemption 1 claims.
51
 Moreover, the evidence suggests that the 
prospect of meaningful oversight -- through in camera inspection 
and non-deferential review -- has provided a significant check on 
extravagant secrecy claims, even when in the end the court has 
merely confirmed the agency’s position.
52
 Finally, FOIA cases 
create a more subtle dynamic of transparency, because litigation 
triggers de-classification review within the agency, often followed 
by partial disclosures under settlement agreements with FOIA 
claimants. Thus, beyond the visible record of court-ordered 
disclosures, the statute has prompted an impressive array of 
ostensibly “voluntary” national security disclosures that almost 
certainly would not have occurred in the absence of indirect 
pressure attributable to FOIA.
53
 
Impressions of the FOIA process are often dominated by cases in 
which disclosure carries the potential for the page-one political 
bombshell. In such cases, the agency and the White House are 
usually determined to preserve secrecy at all costs, and FOIA 
litigation will seldom overcome such resistance. But high-visibility, 
high-stakes cases are the exception. Thousands of noteworthy 
classified documents have faced FOIA scrutiny and thousands 
have been released, with important revelations concerning U.S. 
diplomacy, Justice Department and CIA legal opinions, FBI 
surveillance of public officials, and countless other matters of 
legitimate public concern.
54
 Dozens of books and articles have 
been written on the basis of this “invaluable” material.
55
  
Recently, moreover, judicial oversight has become increasingly 
vigorous. Many FOIA decisions signal discomfort with executive 
demands for deference, mirroring the uneasiness emerging in 
Congress and in public opinion. Deference to intelligence 
community assessments remains common, and departures from 
that pattern can be hesitant and unpredictable. Where such 
departures occur, moreover, the executive branch under President 
                                                
50 See cases cited at note 27, supra.  
51 For example, Goldberg v. Dept. of State, 818 F.2d 71, 77 (DC Cir. 1987); Nuclear Control 
Inst., supra, 563 F.Supp.2d at 768. 
52 See, for example, Wald, supra note 34, at 760-61 (“[I]n most cases the court ends up 
agreeing with the Executive … But [by making] the inquiry, [judges can transmit] to the 
security agencies … the message that they are being held to account.”); STEPHEN DYCUS, 
et al., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 1013 (4th ed. 2007). 
53 Id., at 1014; James X. Dempsey, The CIA and Secrecy, in ATHAN G. THEOHARIS, A 
CULTURE OF SECRECY 41 (1998); Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of Information Act and the 
Ecology of Transparency, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1011, 1051-56 (2008) (documenting 
disclosures under threat of litigation). 
54 See Kreimer, supra note 53, at 1051-56; THEOHARIS, supra note 53, at 17-19, 41-42. 
55 Id., at 17, 41. Over 100,000 pages of classified material have been released in just one 
subset of these cases, those seeking records relating to abuse at detention centers 
overseas. For an overview, with links to the cases and documents, see 
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-v-department-defense-torture-foia. 
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Obama continues to push back tenaciously.
56
 But growing judicial 
assertiveness is unmistakable. Courts often insist on in camera 
inspection,
57
 and orders to release classified documents are no 
longer unusual.
58
 In a striking but not isolated example, the Second 
Circuit recently mandated the release of photographs that vividly 
document the abuse of Abu Ghraib detainees, rejecting 
impassioned administration claims that the disclosure would 
endanger the lives of American troops.
59
  
In sum, although assertive judicial review has been episodic and 
often disappointing, independent oversight has unquestionably 
enhanced governmental transparency, even in the highly sensitive 
area of national security secrets. 
§ 2 – FOIA’S PLACE IN THE WIDER INFORMATION ACCESS 
ENVIRONMENT 
In the US -- as no doubt in other Western democracies -- statutes 
like FOIA do not provide the only avenue for public access to 
information. Whistleblowers and the press, for example, have 
made substantial contributions, as the Snowden and Manning 
revelations make apparent. Yet even those voluminous leaks have 
involved only a small portion of the national security information 
that remains unjustifiably classified.
60
 And in any case, a democracy 
under the rule of law can hardly stake its survival on the willingness 
of whistleblowers to commit serious crimes in order to expose 
matters of justified public concern.  
American reporters enjoy a degree of constitutional protection 
from prosecution that the press cannot claim in many other 
countries, as the strictures of the UK Official Secrets Act make 
clear. But even in the U.S., where reporters are somewhat shielded, 
their sources are not. Manning was court-martialed for violating 
the US Espionage Act and is currently serving a sentence of 35 
years’ imprisonment.
61
 Snowden remains a fugitive facing 
prosecution for harshly punished crimes. A CIA officer who leaked 
                                                
56 For example, PETITION FOR CERTIORARI (Aug. 7, 2009), in ACLU v. Dept. of Defense, 
543 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2008), at 14-15. 
57 For example, ACLU v. Dept. of Defense, 389 F.Supp.2d 547, 573 (SDNY 2005) 
(inspecting photos of detainee abuse and ordering release of most items); Fla. Immigrant 
Advocacy Ctr. v. NSA, 380 F.Supp.2d 1332 (SD Fla. 2005) (judgment for government but 
only after inspecting top-secret document in camera).  
58 For example, Assoc. Press v. Dept. of Defense, 395 F.Supp.2d 17, 18 (SDNY 2005) 
(rejecting government position as “hypocritical”); Gerstein v. Dept. of Justice, 2005 US Dist. 
LEXIS 41276 (ND Cal. 2005) (rejecting mosaic argument); ACLU v. Dept. of Defense, 389 
F.Supp.2d 547, 566 (SDNY 2005) (rejecting Glomar response).  
59 ACLU v. Dept. of Defense, 543 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2008), vacated as moot, 2009 US 
LEXIS 8714 (Nov. 30, 2009). 
60 See note 69 and accompanying text, infra. 
61 See Julie Tate, “Bradley Manning sentenced to 35 years in WikiLeaks case,” WASHINGTON 
POST, August 21, 2013, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/judge-to-sentence-bradley-manning-today/2013/08/20/85bee184-09d0-11e3-
b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2015). 
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information to NY Times reporter James Risen was recently 
convicted of nine serious offenses and faces a potential sentence 
of many decades in prison.
62
 Under those conditions, uncommon 
courage on the part of public-spirited officials cannot obviate the 
need for formal legal mechanisms to grant information access to 
reporters and other interested citizens.
63
 
The US Congress has potent, legally legitimate information-access 
tools, but it usually has little appetite for using them 
constructively.
64
 As a result, oversight in the American context 
often has been weak or misdirected, even when control of 
Congress and the Executive Branch is politically divided. And at 
best, Congress’s tools operate only in one direction. They allow 
Congress to get national security information for itself but give 
Congress almost no authority to release classified documents and 
testimony to the public.
65
 And this inability to share classified 
information with the press and the general public undermines the 
access privileges that Congress itself enjoys, because Congress’s 
motivation to seek information and to act on it depends on political 
incentives, which are likely to remain dormant in the absence of 
public awareness. 
Formal information access rights under FOIA therefore assume 
crucial importance. FOIA creates legal authority for courts to force 
disclosure when they conclude that alleged needs for secrecy are 
overblown. In addition, FOIA judges, unlike those assessing state 
secrets privilege, can make fine-grained judgments, filtering out 
sensitive material and releasing the remainder. In that process, 
FOIA judges can also encourage semi-voluntary disclosure and 
restrain government tendencies to conjure far-fetched national 
                                                
62 See Matt Zapotosky, “Former CIA officer Jeffrey Sterling convicted in leak case,” WASHINGTON 
POST, Jan/ 26, 2015, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/jurors-
tell-judge-they-cant-agree-in-cia-leak-trial-of-jeffrey-sterling/2015/01/26/db819f78-
a57c-11e4-a7c2-03d37af98440_story.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2015). 
63 See Bill Keller, The Times & the Internet, NY REV. BOOKS, Sept. 24, 2009, p. 93 (noting 
importance of FOIA to reporters). 
64 The U.S. Senate’s recent persistence in investigating the CIA’s post-9/11 torture 
practices and in insisting that its report be publicly released are a notable but rare 
exception to this pattern. When Congress obtains access to information that must remain 
secret, its members can reap few political dividends from the time and effort they spend 
on the matter. In any case, the President’s party will almost invariably seek to protect the 
executive branch from criticism. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of 
Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312 (2006). The opposition, in theory, should 
play a vigorous oversight role. But the opposition party is also (and more strongly) 
motivated to win elections, and that goal often imposes different priorities. The 
opposition may use information access simply to expose embarrassing but 
inconsequential executive actions. Conversely, the goal of electoral success may push the 
opposition to simply ignore its national security prerogatives, in order to avoid 
confronting the President on issues of national security, almost always his strongest suit. 
See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 252-53 (1973); Louis 
Fisher, Congressional Abdication: War and Spending Powers, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 931, 946-
1004 (1999). 
65 See FREDERICK M. KAISER, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE: 
CURRENT STRUCTURE AND ALTERNATIVES 2-3 (Cong. Research Service 2007); Heidi 
Kitrosser, Congressional Oversight of National Security Activities: Improving Information Funnels, 
29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049, 1082-83 (2008). 
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security fears. FOIA, of course, is concerned only with access to 
information, not with formal remedies for executive abuse. But if 
FOIA makes the facts available, the press, the public, and then 
Congress can do the rest, at least on matters that arouse 
majoritarian concern. 
Nonetheless, FOIA practice has exposed practical limitations that 
do much to offset its promise. Many courts, reluctant to honor the 
statutory mandate for de novo review, grant the executive a degree 
of latitude that often seems equivalent to carte blanche. Overall, the 
statute, as currently applied, the statute affords offers only a weak, 
somewhat unpredictable weapon for challenging executive control 
of national security information.  
§ 3 – CONSEQUENCES 
Exclusive executive control over national security secrets is 
harmful to all the institutions concerned. Without access to 
relevant information, Congress cannot wisely decide whether or 
how to legislate, courts cannot accurately adjudicate disputes or 
enforce the rule of law, and citizens cannot intelligently participate 
in public affairs.  
The unchecked monopoly is a mixed blessing even for the 
executive branch. Over-classification generates a staggering 
volume of paper and electronic files in need of protection. One 
survey found that government archives contained over 1.5 billion 
pages of classified material that was more than 25 years old.
66
 In 
1997 alone, more than 6.6 million new secrets were created,
67
 and 
by 2007 the pace of classification had tripled.
68
 Yet most 
assessments suggest that “roughly nine-tenths” of classified 
material does not need to be so treated.
69
  
Over-classification hampers the intelligence community itself. 
Out-of-pocket expenditures alone are enormous.
70
 Worse are the 
intangible costs. Elaborate secrecy and the need-to-know principle 
lead to counter-productive “stove-piping” – information is so 
highly compartmentalized that decision-makers are partially 
                                                
66 DANIEL PATRICK MOYNAHAN, SECRECY 55-56 (1998). 
67 INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE, 2007 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 
(May 30, 2008) [hereafter cited as ISOO 2007 REPORT], at 4, 6. 
68 In that year 23 million new documents were added to stock of classified material. Id., 
at 7. 
69 PRESIDENT’S COMM., at 36; HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
CONSTITUTION 201 (1990); SCHLESINGER, supra note 64, at 344 (Pentagon official stated 
that “less than one-half of 1 percent [of classified documents] actually contain 
information qualifying even for the lowest defense classification.”). 
70 For the year 2007, the government reported spending $8.6 billion for classification 
efforts in 42 agencies; private industry spent an additional $1.2 billion, for a total annual 
expense of just under ten billion dollars. ISOO 2007 REPORT, at 28. And these figures 
include none of what is spent on classification at the CIA, the Defense Intelligence 
Agency and other super-secret components of the government; those outlays no doubt 
dwarf the reported figures, but the expenditures of these super-secret agencies are, of 
course, secret. Id. 
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blinded, seeing only part of the relevant data.
71
 Constrained vision 
has been a notorious cause of major blunders, not least the 
intelligence failures leading up to September 11, 2001.
72
 Moreover, 
secrecy dilutes oversight within the Executive Branch. Absent 
accountability for bad choices and incompetence, incentives 
atrophy and quality control withers.
73
  
The implications for democratic processes are more fundamental. 
That secrecy impedes political deliberation is self-evident. 
Moreover, this consequence, often, is not a side-effect of secrecy 
but its very purpose: “The classification system … is used too often 
to deny the public an understanding of the policymaking process, 
rather than for the necessary protection of … highly sensitive 
matters.”
74
 As Arthur Schlesinger warned, secrecy gives the 
executive three strong weapons: to withhold, to leak and to lie.
75
 
By withholding information, the executive prevents outside 
participation in policy decisions. By leaking, the executive builds 
support on an artificial basis – disclosing only those facts that serve 
its purposes. Lying allows the executive to pursue policies without 
having to account for them at all. 
Many acknowledge these problems, at least in general terms, but 
argue that in times of national danger, unilateral executive control 
of sensitive information is justified by the unique expertise of 
executive officials in matters pertaining to national security.  
§ 4 – WHICH BODY CAN BEST MAKE THE REQUIRED 
DECISIONS ABOUT TRANSPARENCY? 
Opponents of judicial oversight in national security matters believe 
that this controversial function lies outside the proper mission of 
the courts. But in a society governed by the rule of law, the core 
mission of the courts -- with their relative insulation from 
distorting personal and political incentives -- is precisely to resolve 
cases and controversies between individuals and government, and 
to provide a remedy when officials exceed their lawful authority.  
A more subtle attribute of courts, less well-known but equally 
crucial, is their attention span. If judges were simply self-governing 
overseers, free to intervene (or not) as they saw fit, their ability to 
check executive overreach would inevitably be episodic and 
                                                
71 MOYNAHAN, supra note 66, at 79. 
72 See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, RETHINKING THE PATRIOT ACT 17-19, 49 (2005) 
(describing Senators’ complaints about inability to obtain information necessary for 
oversight); See US NAT’L COMM. ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, 
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 268-69, 276, 400, 539 n.83 (2004) (same); MOYNAHAN, 
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73 PRESIDENT’S COMM., at 7-8 (“Secrecy has the potential to undermine well-informed 
judgment by limiting the opportunity for input, review, and criticism.”). For in-depth 
discussion of the ways that secrecy interferes with development and execution of effective 
national security policy, see Stephen Holmes, In Case of Emergency: Misunderstanding Tradeoffs 
in the War on Terror, 97 CAL. L. REV. 301 (2009). 
74 Moynahan, Preface, in PRESIDENT’S COMM., at xxi (emphasis added). 
75 SCHLESINGER, supra note 64, at 354-57. 
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undependable. But courts are a very different kind of institution. 
They operate under a mandate to receive claims from aggrieved 
citizens, and then to assess and resolve those claims through the 
detailed steps prescribed for adversarial litigation.  
A legislature, of course, lacks any comparable obligation. And 
legislators face political incentives that in practice tend to weaken 
any commitment they may have to diligent oversight.
76
 As public 
concern and attention shift, as they inevitably will, legislative bodies 
all too often lose interest in a problem and move on to more 
newsworthy matters. Courts have no such prerogative; they offer 
concerned citizens an assured focus and a staying power that 
legislative checks rarely duplicate.
77
 Importantly, therefore, 
oversight functions assigned to the courts stand a far greater 
chance of actually being performed. 
National security matters pose a distinctive difficulty because of the 
sensitivity of the material that judges are called upon to review; 
opponents of judicial oversight routinely cite the concern that 
courts are prone to leaks. Yet in criminal cases, American judges 
conducting trials under the Classified Information Procedures Act 
(CIPA)
78
 have developed experience dealing with vast quantities of 
classified material. In CIPA cases, U.S. courts have tested and fine-
tuned the necessary document-protection measures, without a 
single recorded mishap.
79
  
That said, CIPA provides only a partial test of concerns about 
courthouse security, because in criminal cases the prosecution can 
use its charging discretion to insure that the most sensitive matters 
are never exposed to CIPA processes. FOIA has broader scope, 
and most importantly, the choice of what classified material to 
subject to oversight is not under government control from the 
outset. Thus, FOIA provides a window into judges’ capacity to 
handle any classified material safely and constructively.  
In that regard US FOIA has been a success on many fronts. It has 
exposed self-interested secrecy and made available mountains of 
improperly classified material. At the same time, there is no known 
national security damage attributable to such disclosures, and no 
record of unintended leaks attributable to FOIA review. Yet 
because judges typically use their FOIA powers with restraint, past 
experience under FOIA leaves open the question whether more 
active judicial oversight would simply produce greater benefits, or 
would instead simply produce greater national security risk. 
                                                
76 See note 64, supra. Cf. ROBERT M. PALLITTO & WILLIAM G. WEAVER, PRESIDENTIAL 
SECRECY AND THE LAW 89 (2007) (Congress “cannot subject administrators to the level 
and frequency of scrutiny necessary to systematically discourage abuse”). 
77 See PALLITTO & WEAVER, supra note 76, at 106-07 (Congress transfers oversight to 
courts, to “make the oversight process more enduring and comprehensive”). 
78 18 USC app. 3. 
79 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Oversight of National Security Secrecy in the United States, in 
DAVID COLE, FEDERICO FABBRINI AND ARIANNA VEDASCHI, eds., SECRECY, 
NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE VINDICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 22, 29-31 
(Elgar Publishing, 2013). 
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FOIA litigation, however, has shifted discussion about national 
security expertise away from abstract rhetoric and focused it on 
concrete disputes over specific portions of specific documents. 
That experience demonstrates that debates about expertise are 
distorted by a profound misconception. Commentators who are 
skeptical of judicial review invariably stress that judges almost 
always lack any specialized knowledge or experience in intelligence 
matters.
80
 But judges also lack training in many other subjects that 
they routinely decide. They usually know little or nothing about the 
level of care that is called for when a psychiatrist diagnoses mental 
illness, when doctor performs surgery or when architects and 
engineers design buildings, roads and tunnels. But judges are 
specialists in assessing such matters independently and critically 
assessing the self-interested claims of opposing litigants.  
A sound decision about whether the public should see sensitive 
secrets requires the ability to evaluate conflicting arguments 
impartially and to strike careful compromises, getting assistance 
when appropriate from independent experts, a special master, a 
special advocate or (ideally) security cleared counsel -- the latter 
being the preferred approach in US criminal prosecutions that 
implicate classified information.
81 Sound judgment requires above 
all a generalist’s perspective and the capacity to arbitrate between rival claims. 
In those domains, judges are the experts. National security officials, 
in contrast, usually have no particular skill, experience or 
disposition to reach well-balanced conclusions regarding the 
relative values of secrecy and transparency. To the contrary, they 
have strong incentives to seek unjustified secrecy, for reasons of self-
interest or bureaucratic and political self-protection. Courts, 
therefore, are far less likely to undervalue the public interest in 
disclosure, and this important strength has even greater relevance 
on matters that concern politically weak minorities. 
§ 5 – SOLUTIONS 
In US freedom of information law, one of the major obstacles to 
effective judicial oversight is simply psychological. FOIA courts 
already have a legal mandate to carry out de novo review of the 
question whether national security material is properly classified. 
But most judges simply refuse to exercise their existing powers in 
that regard. If the judiciary is determined to be passive, what can 
be done? 
Legislative insistence on the importance of judicial oversight (in the 
US case, emphatic re-affirmation of this principle) would represent 
one important first step. Such a change, of course, would make 
FOIA even more time-consuming and expensive than it already is. 
                                                
80 For example, Mark Tushnet, Controlling Executive Power in the War on Terror, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 2673, 2679 (2005) (“[j]udges rarely have the background or the information that 
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Critics of transparency litigation cite FOIA’s cost ($400 million 
annually) as a big strike against it.
82
 But that figure, the cost of 
FOIA demands across the entire government, is only a fraction of 
the counterpart expenditures for maintaining secrecy just within 
the publicly reporting national security agencies ($10 billion 
annually),
83
 and little more than a rounding error in the budget of 
the entire enterprise (the U.S. government) that FOIA monitors 
(almost $4 trillion annually).
84
 
With respect to national security material, the US FOIA process 
already generates substantial transparency benefits, but it remains 
disappointing and imperfect. Steps to make it more effective will, 
in the long run, depend less on doctrinal and statutory reform than 
on efforts to raise judicial awareness and a persistent focus in 
public conversation on the need for an independent checking 
mechanism. Most American judges focus only the importance of 
national security expertise and tend to discount their own strength 
in other equally essential skills. This psychological dimension of the 
problem is not easy to fix. But more prominent public discussion 
of the relevant judicial expertise could undoubtedly have significant 
impact. 
CONCLUSION 
Citizen participation in public affairs requires access to 
information. Yet in national security matters, we give the executive 
largely unchecked power to control whatever information it 
chooses to consider sensitive. We have done so unwisely and 
unnecessarily, because citizens, lawyers and judges alike have held 
a myopic view of the required expertise and of the issues at stake 
in judgments about secrecy.  
Although societies have long accepted executive monopoly over 
control of information in the national security area, new 
developments permit the scope of executive control to expand 
exponentially. Smaller, cheaper weapons of mass destruction, less 
complex delivery systems, and less deterrable adversaries create an 
environment of heightened, never-ending danger. Supposedly vital 
national assets can now be attacked from any cyber café in the 
world. National security secrecy is nothing new, but its potential 
for eroding the structures of democracy is growing. 
The executive’s claim to exclusive control over national security 
secrets is buttressed by the widely accepted assumption of a unique 
executive expertise and the corresponding assumption of outsider 
incompetence with regard to military matters and intelligence. Yet 
even in these distinctively specialized areas, many capabilities 
                                                
82 Note, Mechanisms of Secrecy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1564, 1564 (2008). 
83 See note 70, supra. 
84 OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE US GOVERNMENT, 
FISCAL YEAR 2010, Updated Summary Tables (May 2009): 
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necessary for striking the right balance between secrecy and 
transparency are found not in the executive branch but only in 
independent oversight bodies like the courts. Judicial decision-
making expertise can subject large areas of national security activity 
to accountability and the rule of law, without exposing a nation to 
greater danger. Indeed, robust checks and balances are essential for 
safeguarding any nation’s security effectively over the long-term. 
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